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The Mechanics of Scientific Belief  
Introduction  
In "Science: Conjectures and Refutations," Karl Popper establishes a criterion for the 
scientific character or status of a theory: its falsifiability. And in one move, he turns a host of 
common scientific postulates—like the Ideal Gas Law, the Law of Conservation of Mass, 
Newton's First Law, and the Theory of Evolution—into "metaphysical research programs" 
whose nature renders them impossible to disprove though observable experiment ("Natural 
Selection and the Emergence of Mind"). According to Popper, the nature of such postulates 
transcend the physical world; making them just as unfalsifiable as a spiritual power, or a god. In 
this way, they concern belief rather than reality, and thus he does not deem them scientific 
because their credibility is predicated on an inherent faith in the theory’s accuracy. However, 
despite Popper's assertion, scientists continue to use these respective laws and theories. And thus, 
assuming that Popper's claim is valid, what he would call "metaphysical research" permeates 
science today.  
If Popper’s division is assumed to be true, what does this mean for science? Does it 
matter if scientists need to have faith in theories? If a scientist practices science in the same 
manner that a cleric practices theology, then what separates these two? If a scientific community 
practices a level of belief, or even faith, does it lose its secular credibility for explaining reality?  
In making his criterion for scientific theory, Popper transforms much of modern science 
into a faith-based system. However, while modern scientific communities may use unfalsifiable 
beliefs to explain reality, the difference between clerics and scientists lies in the formation and 
function of their respective unfalsifiable theories. Remarkably, acknowledging scientific belief 
actually delineates the practice of unfalsifiable science from the practice of theistic religion, 
illuminating a path to faith-based secular discovery. 	
Falsifiability  
What is falsifiability? In "Science: Conjectures and Refutations," Karl Popper says: "A 
theory which is not refutable by any conceivable event is nonscientific. Irrefutability is not a 
virtue of a theory (as people often think) but a vice" (Popper 7). In addition, he says: "Every 
genuine test of a theory is an attempt to falsify it, or to refute it. Testability is	falsifiability" 
(Popper 7). In short, Popper says that whether or not a person can test a theory, and potentially 
(all theories could *potentially* be disproved) disprove it, determines whether or not it is 
science. If a person cannot potentially disprove a theory, it is instead metaphysical: It is a belief 
beyond physical description, or testability, and beyond the scope of what Popper calls 'good' 
science.  
So what type of "scientific" theories would Popper consider beliefs? Take Isaac Newton's 
first law, for example: "Every body perseveres in its state of rest, or of uniform motion in a right 
line, unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed thereon" ("The Mathematical 
Principles of Natural Philosophy"). More simply, a body will stay in motion unless acted upon 
by an outside force. No matter how rigorous the test—it is impossible to disprove this law. 
Imagine an object in space: If the object moves, a person can say a force (detectable or 
undetectable) has moved it. If the object stops, a person can say a force (detectable or 
undetectable) has stopped it. Regardless of how an object behaves, a scientist can explain its 
behavior in reference to Newton's law. Newton's first law is thus unfalsifiable.  
According to Popper, an unfalsifiable theory is as untestable (the research done on 
theories has the capacity to both prove or disprove the theory) as an omnipotent god. Imagine 
another object in space: If the object moves, a person can say that God has moved it. If the object 
stops, a person can say that God has stopped it. Regardless of how an object behaves, a cleric can 
explain it in reference to a god. Like Newton's first law, God is unfalsifiable. Both, in fact, are 
beyond physical testability. In order to employ God, a person has to believe that God exists. And, 
in order to employ Newton's first law, a person has to believe that the law exists.  
Science and Religion  
Who are clerics, and who are scientists? For the purpose of comparison, this paper refers 
to clerics as people who operate under theism; namely the doctrine or belief in the existence of a 
God or gods. This paper refers to scientists as people who operate under unfalsifiable scientific 
theories; namely, the doctrine or belief in the existence of a scientific theory or theories (like 
Isaac Newton's first law). Furthermore—though not every cleric believes in the same god, nor 
every scientist in the same theory—this paper uses the title religious community to denote a 
group of clerics who believe in the same God or gods, and uses the title scientific community to 
denote a group of scientists who believe in the same theory or theories. Reference to any further 
religious terms (i.e. layperson, prophet, clergy) extrapolate from the definition of cleric and 
religious community above, in order to provide a frame of reference for their scientific 
counterparts, and to diagram the mechanics of scientific belief. This comparison realizes that 
neither science nor religion is a monolithic institution. Both contain a diverse and nuanced 
culture, outside the scope of this paper to aptly classify. Keeping this nuance in mind, the 
following comparisons between science and religion serve only the sects of each that subscribe 
to unfalsifiable belief. And if examples do call on the larger body of science or religion, it is only 
in an attempt to discover the respective scientific or religious tools at each communities' disposal 
when working with theory or belief.  
Faith-based Systems  
A faith-based system refers to a group, whether religious or scientific, that operates under 
theism or unfalsifiable scientific theories. Given Popper's criterion, a scientific community may 
resemble a religious community, in basis and in structure, as observers of a particular belief or 
set of beliefs.  
A religious community of clerics believes information about God. Clerics cannot falsify 
their beliefs about God, and thus, like Newton, their theories fall outside of Popper's criterion. 
Ignoring Popper, pious clerics devote their lives to scriptures that hinge on these very 
unfalsifiable theories. They then communicate their ideas to other clerics or laypeople within 
their religion. Not quite as immersed, laypeople also consult scripture, but perhaps more 
sporadically as a basic foundation for how to live.  In order to enact change, a religious 
community may use prophets (like Jesus or Buddha). These prophets might think differently than 
everyone else initially, but eventually turn the course of communal belief. And to safeguard 
against too much change, clerics can employ dogma. Take the prophet Jesus for example: though 
Jesus' ideas serve as the foundation for one of the largest religions today—his contemporary 
clerics employed dogma to reject  his then "radical" religious ideas and prevent change of their 
established religious traditions (Zeitlin 9).  
A scientific community that ascribes to unfalsifiable theories believes set information 
about the universe. Like clerics, scientists devote their time to theories. Scientists interpret 
mainstream scientific beliefs, and then convey their ideas to common people, or students, who 
might not concern themselves with the theory as much as the scientists. In fact, these common 
people, or students of science, might consult scientists' unfalsifiable theories about as much as a 
layperson might consult a religious scripture.   
In order to enact change, a scientific community may employ paradigm shifters. In 
comparison to a religious prophet, a scientific community can use what Thomas S. Kuhn might 
call a “scientific revolutionary”, someone who operates outside of the currently accepted 
scientific paradigm (Kuhn 53). These are innovators like Newton or Albert Einstein, who 
fundamentally change the course of scientific theory. Similar to religion's safeguard against too 
much change, science may also use dogma to maintain standards and protect agreed upon 
knowledge. In conjunction with a critical method, Popper deems dogma essential to science: 
"this dogmatism allows us to approach a good theory in stages, by way of approximations: if we 
accept defeat too easily, we may prevent ourselves from finding that we were very nearly right" 
(Popper 24). Imagine a fellow sixteenth- century astronomer reading Galileo's work for the first 
time, or an established twentieth-century physicist first reading Einstein's theory of special 
relativity. In each case, these ideas will be met with dogmatic resistance and loyalty to 
established ideas, showing even scientists operating under falsifiable theories hold tightly to 
traditional models before adopting new ones.  
So if scientists use "metaphysical research programs" much like a clergy might use 
scripture, why would a secular person rely on science and not religion? Since scientists believe in 
theories about the universe—like clerics may believe in God—are they void of a secular method 
to describe the universe? The answer is no. And the difference between scientists and clerics lies 
in the mechanics of their respective unfalsifiable theories and in their formation and their 
function.  
The Mechanism of Scientific Belief  
In the formation of a religious theory, clerics often take on a passive role in relation to 
God. For example, though religious communities (sometimes) allow for clerics to ask questions 
about God, the clerics have to wait on God for a response. In a religious pursuit of knowledge 
about the world, clerics might question the universe in the form of prayer. It is God's universe 
after all, so as humans they respect his knowledge on the subject and wait for revelation. In this 
respect, clerics acting with interrogative forms of prayer—for example, Why does the earth move 
around the sun, God?—need a response (or what they may interpret as a legitimate response) in 
order to answer their question. Therefore, in their pursuit of knowledge, God is the active party 
and they are passive. God creates knowledge, and they receive it. In such communities where an 
omnipotent god holds the key to knowledge, if God wants to hide or withhold ideas, humans can 
do little to stop God. In addition,  if new human experience contrasts with existing religious 
theory, clerics have to wait for God to modify that theory. Their experience requires approval 
from God before it can contribute to religious theory. This method of passive inquiry is in 
keeping with many religious communities' prophets, who in turn do not discover new theories or 
beliefs, but rather reveal new beliefs through their dialogue with God.  
In the formation of scientific theory, scientists take on an active role relation to the 
universe. Concerning modern science, Popper says: "we actively try to impose regularities upon 
the world. We try to discover similarities in it, and to interpret it in terms of laws invented by us" 
(Popper 19). Scientists question the universe, like clerics do God. But in contrast to religion, 
their answers do not hinge on the response from an elusive divine power. Instead of waiting for 
the universe, or a prophet to speak to them, scientists impose tests, or devise mathematical 
language to decode the mysterious aspects of the universe themselves. Even in a hypothesis 
test—a method of inquiry that might seem to hinge on passive waiting— scientists are active: 
they arrange a time and a place in which they expect to see a reaction from the universe, the 
subject of their test.  
What about uncertainty concerning a theory? In contrast to religion, if a theory is 
unfalsifiable, scientists do not have to fatalistically accept that God will give them information in 
the future. Instead, a scientist can accept the current boundaries of human comprehension; or 
trust that, someday, thanks to subsequent human progress, he or she may understand the theory 
enough to render it falsifiable. Consequently, pertaining to prophets, scientific paradigm shifters 
—like Charles Darwin, Newton, and Einstein—do not reveal theories, or pass them on from 
universe-dialogue. Rather, they engage in dialogue with other humans or their own minds to 
discover theories, even unfalsifiable ones, which they then choose to believe.  
Though Popper might say, "It is easy to obtain confirmations, or verifications, for nearly 
every theory—if we look for confirmations",  both scientists and clerics do look for evidence to 
support their respective unfalsifiable theories (Popper 7). They distinguish themselves from one 
another in the ways they compare evidence: while a religious community may allow evidence to 
come in the form of private experience, a scientific community requires that evidence come in 
the form of public, measurable experience.  In a religious community, members share 
experiences with each other. And they often share these experiences with other members in their 
religious communities to support their common beliefs. What distinguishes a religious 
community, however, is that the community may allow for private, immeasurable experience to 
contribute to the body of evidence supporting a religious theory. In such a community, if a 
religious theory does rest on private experience, new evidence concerning that belief may have a 
muted effect within the community. For example, consider a hypothetical cleric named Joseph. 
In a religious community,  Joseph has a private experience that captures God's attitude toward 
hedonism, and this experience has a profound effect on Joseph's beliefs. Even after a vivid 
description of his experience, his fellow clerics may remain privately unfazed by his retelling. 
How do Joseph's fellow clerics reconcile their own theory of God's attitude toward hedonism 
with his? If Joseph's experience contradicts their established theory, they can easily decide that 
their private experience trump's Joseph’s. In turn, the rest of the clergy can keep on believing as 
they did before. Joseph's evidence may be forgotten. And the religious communities' communal 
theory about hedonism can remain mostly unaltered.  
The immeasurability of religious accounts makes evidence difficult to communicate. At 
the present time, religions lack a mathematical standard for religious experience, a miracle- 
meter, or God-o-meter, which would help them communicate evidence about common beliefs. If 
they did possess such a tool, clerics who witnessed God's attitude toward hedonism would be 
able to inform the rest of the group (of perhaps a seven on their God-o-meter); thereby making a 
meaningful contribution to religious theory, and, most importantly, changing the relationship of 
their fellow members to their God.  Contrary to clerics, scientists stress the measurement of 
evidence in their community. Unlike religious theory, scientific theory rests on public, 
measurable evidence in the form of observable facts which inform theories. Scientists also share 
experiences, like clerics, but if a scientist has a private experience and wants it to contribute to 
scientific theory, she has to present measurable evidence for the rest of her fellow scientists to 
witness. Only then will scientists appreciate her evidence and will her account contribute to the 
public store of data that informs a theory. For example, a scientist may collect facts that 
contribute to the Theory of Evolution. These observable facts may not make the Theory of 
Evolution any less unfalsifiable, as Popper would note, but say a scientist notes genetic 
mutations in a thousand of the same species and sees that a specific mutation proliferates more 
each year. His raw numerical data would allow other scientists to measure the change in gene 
prevalence along with him and, subsequently, transform his enterprise from a private to a public 
one—all without compromising his initial experience. It is exactly this transfer of information 
that differs most from religious evidence. Within a scientific community, even one seemingly 
inconsequential scientist's measurable evidence can inform a theory for all scientists—and thus 
change the relationship of the other scientists to the universe.  
In addition to science's preoccupation with measurement, the function of scientific theory 
differs from that of religious theory. A religious belief often concerns itself with governance, 
while a scientific belief concerns itself with description.  A theory in a religious community often 
governs. In this respect the metaphor of a law fits well. Clerics might believe that God makes 
laws for their world, and these metaphysical laws can manifest themselves within the community 
in the form of physical rules. These rules may control laypersons, and dictate the behavior of 
God as well. For example, in a house of worship, be it a chapel, mosque, or synagogue, clerical 
theories about God's clothing preference often form dress codes. People in the religious 
community then follow the dress codes—and, in turn, represent their belief making a physical 
law: their belief enforcing standards on reality.  
Religious beliefs also make rules that shape God's behavior. Consider Keith Ward's 
discussion of divine acts in The Big Questions in Science and Religion. He says that many divine 
acts have to "surpass nature's regularities" in order for a religious person to consider them Godly 
(Ward 246). Consider a religious community living in Hawaii: If the community experiences a 
light rainstorm, clerics will probably think little of it. However, if the same community 
experiences a massive hurricane that sweeps through the islands and tears down homes, clerics 
may very well attribute the storm to an act, whether good or bad, of divinity. Because the latter 
experience broke certain "natural regularities," this weather then takes on the label of divine, or 
supernatural. This type of theory illustrates religious convictions' preoccupation for governance. 
Beliefs make rules. And, in this case, if a god wants to act in the universe, he or she has to break 
those rules.  
Rather than governing, a theory of science describes. In this respect the metaphor of a 
law is misleading. Once again take Newton, the quintessential "lawmaker," but note the diction 
in his first law. He says, "Every body perseveres in its state of rest, or of uniform motion in a 
right line, unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed thereon ("The 
Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy"). Upon close examination, Newton's theory does 
not dictate nature or the universe in any way. He does not say that every body must persevere, or 
else it goes to a universe prison. His belief outlines nature and the manner in which it seems to 
act. This descriptive rather than judicial quality highlights a reoccurring distinction between 
scientists and clerics. Imagine a synagogue, for example, full of people on the Shabbat. A 
clerical belief may very well dictate: God's law necessitates that here men wear their yarmulkes. 
However, in the same scenario, a scientific belief would only describe: on Saturdays, men fill 
this place and wear yarmulkes. Here, the scientist's theory does not make a rule for the physical 
world, though the cleric's does.  
The same principle of description applies to Popper's metaphysical research programs. 
Popper contrasts Darwin's descriptive theory with a religious alternative in "Natural Selection 
and the Emergence of Mind." In a religious theory, Popper says: "It is the Creator who, by His 
design, molds matter, and instructs it which shape to take" ("Natural Selection and the 
Emergence of Mind"). In contrast, Darwin's theory does not instruct animal life. When Darwin 
coined the term "Survival of the Fittest," nature did not start to behave any differently. Darwin 
may have changed the human perception of nature—but Darwin's theory placed no rule on the 
natural world. Nature carried on, and animals continued to reproduce in the same patterns they 
had for centuries.  
Conclusion  
In making his criterion for scientific theory, Karl Popper transforms much of modern science 
into a faith-based system. And much of theistic religion also operates as a faith-based system. At 
first glance, therefore, Popper renders scientific theory similar to mysterious, theistic religious 
belief. However, by acknowledging the underpinning mechanics of scientific belief, the practice 
of unfalsifiable science distinguishes itself from the practice of theistic religion. In contrast with 
the passive, private, and dictatorial theories manifested in veins of theistic religion —faith-based, 
unfalsifiable science devotes itself to active, measurable, and descriptive theory. A scientific 
theory may therefore, superficially, resemble theism, but still direct a course for wholly secular 
discovery, preserving some separation between the two schools of unfalsifiable belief.  
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